DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

APR 25 2001

Honorable Bob Stump
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As required by Section 1031 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, I submit the enclosed report addressing the preparedness of military installation first responders for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

Sincerely,

Paul Wolfowitz

Enclosure:
As stated

cc:
Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Democrat

REPORT TO CONGRESS

INSTALLATION FIRST RESPONDER PREPAREDNESS

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MARCH 26, 2001

REPORT TO CONGRESS

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INTRODUCTION

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, PL 106-398, directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress addressing the preparedness of military installation first responders for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (sec.1031). Reporting requirements include:

- *A detailed description of the overall preparedness program.*
- *A detailed description of the deficiencies in the preparedness of Department of Defense installations to respond to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction, together with a discussion of the actions planned to be taken by the Department of Defense to correct the deficiencies.*
- *The schedule and costs associated with the implementation of the preparedness program.*
- *The Department's plan for coordinating the preparedness program with responders in the communities in the localities of the installations.*
- *The Department's plan for promoting the interoperability of equipment used by the military installation first responders.*

This report examines the preparedness of military installation first responders for incidents involving WMD. Section 1031 defined the term "first responder" as, "an organization responsible for responding to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction." First responders include personnel from medical, law enforcement (or security), fire/rescue, hazardous material (HAZMAT), and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) organizations. The term "military installation" typically applies to a military location that has 300 or more personnel.

This report also discusses how installation first responders coordinate response actions with their civilian counterparts in local communities. Consideration was given as to the plan for promoting the interoperability of the equipment used by the installation first responders with the equipment used by the civilian first responders. The report also addresses deficiencies within the installation first responder program and considers actions required for correcting the deficiencies.

The focus of this report is on the Installation Pilot Program, which officially began October 1, 2000, for designated installations. The pilot installations are clearly at the forefront of the individual Service programs, much like the designated cities within the Domestic Preparedness Program (see next section of report).

The emphasis for this report is the status of the Services' efforts to address pilot installation preparedness within the Continental United States (CONUS). The information contained in this report is extracted primarily from data provided by the Services concerning their pilot installations. However, as some pilot installations are outside the continental United States (OCONUS), consideration was given to all installations, especially those that are part of the Installation Pilot Program (details to follow). Each Service is using the Installation Pilot Program to develop a blueprint for their remaining installations and to identify lessons learned in addressing first responder issues.

BACKGROUND

In 1996, Congress took definitive steps to address the threat of attack from terrorists utilizing WMD. This effort was part of "The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996," commonly referred to as Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation, which included an effort to provide training for specific cities to enhance civilian local response capabilities for WMD incidents. DoD was tasked to coordinate this effort and established the Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP).

With the implementation of the Domestic Preparedness Program, questions arose regarding the preparedness of our military installations to deal with the consequences of a WMD incident. There was a general consensus that our military installations should be better prepared for a WMD event. Consequently, in 1999, the Deputy Secretary of Defense mandated in a program budget directive, that each of the Services collectively identify 15-20 sites to serve as a proving ground in developing a blueprint for enhancing the preparedness for first responders on military installations. This effort was called the Installation Pilot Program. Each Service then proceeded to identify specific pilot installations; annex A lists installations selected by each Service.

Each Service addressed the Installation Pilot Program with a unique set of criteria. The Army selected a cross section of their installations using various categories such as small, large, National Guard, Army Reserve, and support facilities. The Navy selected installations primarily based upon threat. The Air Force selected their installations based upon mission and WMD threats. The

Marine Corps chose its installations based on threat factors and selective antiterrorism activities already in place.

The implementation schedule for Service's Installation Pilot Program is also Service unique. Each is dependent upon numerous factors such as funding, location, threat and present preparedness. The Army addresses their installation requirements collectively year-to-year. The Air Force plans to support all six pilot installations concurrently with respect to equipment, and approximately one installation each year for training. The Navy addresses their installations requirements based on a definitive number of installations per year. The Marine Corps chose two installations initially and then will proceed to the next group of four installations.

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM

The Services are making progress in moving forward within the planning process to improve military installation first responders preparedness for WMD incidents. Each Service has addressed first responder issues with methodology, timetables, threat assessments, location consideration, and available resources unique to their respective organizations. Consequently, each Service is at a different stage with their preparedness activities.

Historically, priority for installation first responder planning has centered on the likelihood of traditional non-WMD incidents, such as: routine fire/rescue service, day-to-day emergency medical responses, security, hazardous material operations (HAZMAT), and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). Many of these same resources that the installations currently have will be utilized in responding to a WMD event. However, planners have not historically dedicated or had the extra level of support required for a WMD incident. This is due in part to the emerging threat and catastrophic nature of a WMD incident, as well as the exceedingly high cost to properly prepare for such an event. While installation first responders are making great strides in training and equipping themselves, resources remain a challenge.

Central to planning for installation responses is a thorough understanding and integration of the elements within the Federal Response Plan (FRP). The FRP provides direction and a framework for our federal government's response to a declared disaster, both on military installations and civilian communities. When a disaster has been declared, a federal response can proceed according to the guidelines included within the Federal Response Plan. However, the plan is complex, potentially involving numerous organizations such as the Department of Transportation, the Department of Defense and other such organizations, as well

as the Federal Emergency Management Administration. Additionally, representatives from local, state, and federal organizations are involved in the coordination, through the disaster field office. Responses to events such as floods or hurricanes are complex - for a WMD event the complexity is magnified.

Interoperability of equipment used by installation and community first responders is also progressing forward, primarily through the use of the Standardized Equipment List (SEL), which is generally accepted by both parties. Unfortunately, many cities (especially those not in the DPP) have older equipment that is not on the updated SEL. Procurement of new, standardized equipment is expensive. Thus, the challenge of resolving the problem of non-standardization of equipment is driven primarily by lack of available funding.

Responsibilities for first responder preparedness are Service unique.

- The Army delegates the responsibility for its installations down to the individual installation commander. The installation commander assumes responsibility for the preparedness for a WMD event, the same as the installation commander would for any other emergency response.
- For the Air Force, the responsibility for installation first responder preparedness lies with the Civil Engineer (Headquarters, United States Air Force/Installations and Logistics).
- Responsibility for the Navy's first responder readiness is split. The Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command is responsible for all installation fire departments' readiness, to include WMD. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Readiness & Logistics) is the resource sponsor for ashore Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP), which includes the resources for fire and security departments. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations) is the assessment sponsor for AT/FP and is responsible for requirements definition for all Navy AT/FP. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Warfare Requirements and Programs) has responsibility for resources and requirements for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units. The Surgeon General of the Navy has responsibility for medical resources and requirements.
- Presently, the Marine Corps is conducting a study of its first responder program (which will not be completed until April 2001), but it is envisioned to be "centrally managed and funded, but locally executed."

The following illustrates some of the Services' initiatives in implementing the Installation Pilot Program. The Army has published and circulated the Antiterrorism and Force Protection Installation Commander's Guide to assist commanders in focusing on eight critical "must do" tasks to prepare for WMD incidents. This guide is further complemented by the Installation Preparedness for

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Installation Commander's Blueprint, which provides commanders with common sense "how to" steps to accomplish the tasks of the commander's guide. The Blueprint is in the final stages of editing.

For the Air Force, the Air Staff NBC Team designed draft installation prioritization criteria, then incorporated Major Command (MAJCOM) inputs. This assisted with the prioritization of its installations, considering missions such as: air mobility, power projection, space operations, command, control, and information operations, single integrated operational plan, logistics and training, WMD threats (regional and local), and operational single point failure.

The focus of the Navy first responder pilot program is on developing an integrated response capability for WMD incidents. As early as 1998, the Navy Region Mid-Atlantic had formed a committee made up of major players who would be involved in a response to a WMD incident. The committee developed five checklists, which included fire, operations, security, the installation commander, and an Installation Commander's Self-Assessment. The first four checklists addressed actions to be taken and point of contact if a WMD incident took place. The last gave installation commanders an instrument to complete a self-evaluation of their WMD program. The overall Regional Operations Plan for a biological or chemical incident was developed with input from military, federal, and state agencies. It incorporated specific tasks for designated units who would respond to a biological or chemical incident.

As previously mentioned, the Marine Corps has recently awarded EAI Corporation a contract to methodically evaluate the overall Marine Corps WMD first response capability, as well as that of individual installations. The information contained in the formal report will enable the Marine Corps to address planning issues, further enhancing their preparedness.

Additional efforts have come from the Army's Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM). It has developed a WMD installation preparedness program based on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (the Department of Justice presently has oversight of the DPP). The installation preparedness program provides a systematic "crawl, walk, run" approach to preparing military installations to respond to WMD incidents. It includes planning assistance, training (seven responder courses), exercises (three tabletops and one Field Training Exercise) and technical assistance in the form of equipment consultations and building protection assessments. This program was successfully piloted at Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina in 1999. The program is conducted with mobile teams, which assemble on the installation to promote synergy and interoperability among the military and civilian responders, as well as their counterparts in the local, state, and federal

communities. SBCCOM will be discussed in more detail in the next section of this report.

As the senior military advisor to the Secretary of Defense for force protection, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducts assessments on 90 – 100 installations a year worldwide using DoD standards as a basis. The Chairman's Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) Team examines the installation commander's antiterrorism program, to include the antiterrorism plan. The plan is designed to protect the installation by addressing the following key elements: terrorism threat assessment, physical security measures, terrorist incident response measures, and consequence management measures. As additional information and data is obtained from the JSIVA visits to the installations, these "lessons learned" may be incorporated into the overall planning and preparedness for not only our pilot installations, but for all DoD installations worldwide.

Antiterrorism standards are articulated within Department of Defense Instructions 2000.16, "DoD Antiterrorism Standards." This standard was written to assist installations by establishing combating terrorism program standards. Standard 18, Terrorist Consequence Management Measures, tasks commanders to include terrorist consequence preparedness and response measures as an adjunct to their antiterrorism plan. These measures should include emergency response and disaster planning and/or preparedness to respond to a terrorist attack for installation and/or base engineering, logistics, medical, mass casualty response, transportation, personnel administration, and local and/or host nation support. DoDI 2000.16 Standard 19, Training and Exercises, requires commanders to conduct field and staff training to exercise antiterrorism plans, to include physical security measures, terrorist incident response measures and terrorist consequence management measures at least annually.

COORDINATION/INTEROPERABILTY WITH LOCAL FIRST RESPONDERS

Coordination between military installations and local communities has been a long-standing tradition. Consequently, the Services do a good job in developing rapport with their civilian communities. All installations are authorized and encouraged to develop training plans, exercises and memoranda of agreement with local communities for emergency response.

Most installations and communities have completed or will complete integrated exercise programs by the end of FY 2001. As expected, there are differences as to the level, scope, and magnitude of those exercises, depending

upon the size, location, and capabilities of the installation and the local community. Many larger installations have already completed numerous tabletop and functional exercises. However, as each civilian locality is different, each working relationship is unique. In some cases, smaller installations may not have specific emergency response capabilities; local civilian authorities may provide the sole support (i.e. fire protection).

Memoranda of agreement and mutual aid agreements are key enabling documents between installations and local communities. Most installations have "institutionalized" requirements for memoranda of agreement in various Service regulations, directives, and publications. However, it is unclear whether all such agreements presently address WMD incidents, but this will be considered as memoranda of agreement are updated and as part of the integrated vulnerability assessment. While not all installations have formal memoranda of agreement, most have at least a mutual aid agreement with the surrounding jurisdictions (a memorandum of agreement being a formal document, whereas a mutual aid agreement tends to be less formal or specific, or even may be an oral agreement). The overall goal of each Service program, however, is to form a coordinated effort when responding to a WMD incident.

Although there is clear authority to enter into reciprocal agreements for mutual aid in furnishing fire protection, the authority to deal with WMD is unclear; nonetheless, almost all installations have some type of memorandum of agreement or mutual aid support agreement with their local civilian communities. However, to encompass the complexities of joint WMD response capabilities, it is imperative that installations and civilian communities have a clear understanding of mutual roles and responsibilities, particularly when multiple organizations are present. Installation representatives frequently participate in local Disaster Preparedness Committee meetings. The installation commander, provost marshal, plans and training officers, and force protection managers meet and interact with their civilian community counterparts. For Army installations, such initiatives are specifically encouraged in the Installation Commander's Guide and Blueprint. These initiatives must comply with DoD Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities," which provides guidelines for military interaction with the civilian community.

Air Force installations are required by Air Force Instruction 32-4001, "Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program," to have mutual aid support agreements on major accident reporting, response and support. Memoranda of agreement and Host Nation agreements ensure an effective coordinated response between the Air Force and civilian communities. Base commanders address exercises, training, and interoperability of equipment during coordination of memoranda of agreement between installations and localities through the Local Emergency Preparedness

Committee (LEPC) or Area Contingency Plan (ACP) working group. These written agreements and exercises have been extended to terrorist WMD incidents. Existing mutual aid agreements between Air Force first responders and their civilian counterparts form the structural foundation to more specific WMD response plans and operations. Furthermore, interoperability with the local community is enhanced through training, exercises, communications, and striving for standardization in as many areas as possible.

Air Force first responders exercise annually with their civilian counterparts, using the Disaster Response Force infrastructure. The Air Force varies the type of WMD attack to include nuclear/radiological, biological, chemical, incendiary, and explosive materials. The exercises must be cross-functionally executed, terrorist WMD threat-specific, and incorporate all local response elements. Coordination is required between the staff judge advocate, installation commander, and civil authorities (local, state, and federal).

The Air Force is investigating the possible use of the Soldier and Biological Chemical Command program and services provided by the University of Texas A&M Emergency Responder Training Program. The program is currently sanctioned under contract to the Department of Justice. The training format of Texas A&M includes exercises, distance learning, and on-site training. Installations are currently leveraging the Department of Justice Domestic Preparedness Program by sending military personnel to train alongside civilian first responders. Three "Emergency Response to Terrorism" interactive training CD ROMs were published by Headquarters Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (HQ AFCESA) and distributed to all Air Force installations. The Air Force goal is to integrate the best practices from all available sources and create improved, economical first responder training and exercises to ensure Air Force first responder proficiency and interoperability with local, state, and federal responders.

At Navy installations, OPNAVINST 11320.23F, "Shore Activities Fire Protection and Emergency Services Program," establishes policies, standards, guidance, and responsibilities for the Navy-wide Shore Activities Fire Protection and Emergency Services Program. This guidance mandates that installation disaster response plans be coordinated with surrounding jurisdictions and tested at least annually. Coordination of the plan requires maintenance of relationships with local government entities and first responders. The type of support (such as fire service) varies based upon the location of the installation, the surrounding community, installation assets, and other factors.

As previously stated, upon completion of the installation preparedness study, being conducted by EAI Corporation, the Marine Corps will determine their program needs and specific tasks to be addressed. The pilot program utilizes front-end analysis and a six-task systematic approach. The tasks with the program are as follows: task one includes collect information, literature search and threat assessment; task two includes chemical/biological response capabilities and candidate metrics; task three includes assay installations/communities and assay installation size/mission; task four includes generate recommended equipment list and resource options, baseline, current threat, future threat, and solutions; task five includes alternative strategies; and task six includes plan of action and milestones. Coordination with local responders is embedded within the tasks.

In 1998 the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed a study to assess the impact of a chemical or biological attack on an installation that serves as a power projection site (i.e. a site that our forces would launch from in time of a crisis). Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, were chosen as sites to undergo the initial study. That effort, the *Pope/Bragg Study*, concluded that chemical/biological attacks would significantly delay deploying forces and could impair mission achievement by those forces. It further suggested that many vulnerabilities observed could be minimized through a preparedness program consisting of planning, training, exercises and equipment. The major recommendation from this study was that DOD establish a program of installation preparedness to enhance awareness, plans and preparations for the possibility of chemical/biological attacks at key force projection sites. This critical need formed the basis of the *Pope/Bragg Pilot.*

Based on its experience in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program and participation in the *Pope/Bragg Study*, the Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) has developed a WMD Installation Preparedness Program for U.S. military installations. The WMD Installation Preparedness program has been successfully piloted at Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base. The program's objective was to validate an approach for preparing key military installations against asymmetric attacks involving WMD. It consisted of planning, training, exercises and other technical assistance. The program targeted installation commanders and their staffs; installation emergency responders (fire, HazMat, law enforcement/security, healthcare providers) and their counterparts in the local, state, federal and host nation communities.

The program's results illustrate that installation preparedness for a chemical or biological attack substantially reduces the impact (45% reduction in delay) on the deployment mission as well as the impact on the installation's operations. The WMD Installation Preparedness Program has been endorsed by both Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base. In addition, the U.S. Army Forces

Command (FORSCOM) recommends the program as the way ahead for the Army in preparing installation first responders for a WMD event.

SBCCOM has modified the Domestic Preparedness Program to provide a similar training syllabus for installations. Army installations can use this syllabus to conduct necessary training. The Air Force also includes this program as a source document for developing training plans. The Navy will also use this training plan for its pilot program. As previously mentioned, the Marine Corps is awaiting finalization of its study contract in April 2001. The key feature of the SBCCOM program is that it leverages the Domestic Preparedness Program, which provided training for WMD response to local first responders. Thus, it promotes a common training base between installations and local responders.

EQUIPMENT / INTEROPERABILITY WITH LOCAL FIRST RESPONDERS

In October 1998, The Attorney General of the United States and the Army's Director of Military Support collaborated as members of an interagency board to enhance equipment standardization and interoperability. Its goal was to encourage the research and development of advanced technologies, and to assist first responders at the state and local levels in establishing and maintaining a robust crisis and consequence management capability. From this initiative, the standardized equipment list (SEL) was developed and provided an equipment baseline for all first responders.

The SEL promotes interoperability and standardization among the response communities at the local, state, and federal levels. It is provided to civilian communities as a guideline and its use is voluntary. Interagency partners adopting the SEL increase standardization and interoperability at all levels, hence increasing efficiency of employment during WMD response operations. First responders are to review the SEL when determining and acquiring their WMD response equipment. Individual government agencies dictate quantities of the items to be purchased to meet the needs of their operational areas.

Interoperability with local first responders is improving, since many installations train in accordance with the DPP guidelines and makes use of the SEL. However, our installation first responders use a mix of military and commercial protective equipment for emergency responses. Their equipment meets National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) or military specifications. While NIOSH/OSHA standards exist for commercial hazardous materials, none exist specifically for chemical warfare agents. Also, the interface

between standards, equipment, and procedures is not defined across the spectrum of military unique and domestic support activities. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards do not bind specific military resources, as a WMD response may be militarily unique because of the tactical situation. Consequently, the equipment required in wartime environment might be different than that required by a civilian first responder working in a non-hostile environment.

Through local coordination, installation first responders attempt to standardize equipment where possible. However, there are no formal, top-down driven programs to implement this, since it is a local issue with each installation. The Services cannot insist that local jurisdictions purchase the same equipment. They can, however, coordinate with civil authorities in an attempt to achieve maximum interoperability. By training and coordinating with local responders and following the SEL, the Service installations strive to incorporate equipment interoperable with that used by local counterparts. However, there are exceptions, such as the use of military-unique equipment (like the M40 protective mask).

Success in deterring, preparing for, and responding to a WMD terrorist attack in the United States is based upon establishing and maintaining a robust crisis and consequence management infrastructure. This capability must be adequately manned, trained, equipped, funded, exercised, and capable of conducting response, relief and recovery operations as part of an interagency team.

The Services are making progress; however, difficulties still exist as modernization and standardization of equipment pose a major concern across the entire first responder spectrum. Much of this is due to limited funding. When resources are available, installation personnel do interface with their local counterparts during exercises and attend common training sessions.

COST ESTIMATES

To date, the Services have not had an official mechanism in place to specifically track installation first responder costs for a WMD event. These costs historically have been embedded into the emergency support accounts. To collect the data requested, the Services are in the process of developing WMD unique cost accounting codes to program, budget, and track execution of training, equipping, and sustaining installation first responder assets for a WMD event.

The following table reflects resources committed by the Services funding their respective Installation Pilot Program for FY2001:

INSTALLATION PILOT PROGRAM

SERVICE	FY2001 CURRENT ESTIMATE
ARMY **	500
AIR FORCE	2,711
NAVY	1,074
MARINES	500
TOTAL	4,785

**Additional Army costs are embedded in overall response programs and are not reflected

Turnkey cost projections for installation first responder preparedness for the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps generally average between $900 thousand and $1.5 million per installation. There is substantial difference in preparedness costs primarily due to location, size, numbers of personnel, threat, and local civilian support for each installation. The Army currently funds its WMD first responder preparedness program at approximately $500 thousand per year. These funds are primarily used for training purposes to upgrade the installation capabilities to respond to a WMD event.

DEFICIENCIES/CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The Services have identified deficiencies that impact basically *all* installation first responders. Corrective actions are being taken where funding permits and installations prioritized in the Installation Pilot Program. First responder deficiencies vary widely in accordance with the installations' different missions, sizes, proximity to civilian population centers, and first responder equipment on hand. The most common deficiencies are the lack of funding to purchase needed first responder equipment and to conduct training.

Army installation deficiencies fall into three general areas: equipment, personnel, or training. To correct these deficiencies, the Major Army Commands (MACOMs) have directed installations to:

1) Determine potential threats or model threats for installations.
2) Determine the installation capabilities/resources available to draw upon for responding to a WMD incident.
3) Place the resources/capabilities into a plan to counter the threat(s) (actual or modeled).
4) Exercise plans annually.

As installations identify weaknesses and requirements, they are required to revise their plans to correct weaknesses, plan procurement options, or address a given accepted risk.

Air Force program deficiencies include a lack of policy and guidance, an integrated training and exercise program, and first responder equipment. The Air Force is currently completing coordination of several documents to provide needed planning, organization, equipage, training, and exercise/evaluation program policy guidance for commanders and first responders. The planned policy guidance documents implement the recently published Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.8, "Counter Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Operations." Other documents now in draft include Air Force Policy Directive 10-25 "Full Spectrum Threat Response," Air Force Instruction 10-2501, "Full Spectrum Threat Response Planning and Operations," Air Force Handbook, 10-2502, "WMD Threat Planning and Response," and Air Force Instruction 10-2601, "Counter-NBC Operations, Passive Defense." The Air Force is continuing to develop their Baseline Equipment Data Assessment List, based upon the SEL.

General deficiencies throughout the Navy include immature Chemical Biological Radiological Defense (CBR-D) plans; lack of integration of CBR-D roles and missions; insufficient CBR-D equipment; limited military/civilian coordination; existing bilateral instruments that do not address CBR-D; and shore facilities that lack an independent capability to respond to a CBR-D attack/incident. There is an immediate reliance on other agencies after initial response.

The Navy installation pilot program identifies and develops ways to improve first responder readiness. The uniqueness of each pilot site will provide best practices to be applied at other bases throughout the Navy. As the pilot program progresses, other installations will have the data required to program for planning, training and equipment to reach a higher readiness level.

The Marine Corps identified deficiencies that include a lack of: adequate mass casualty triage and long-term treatment facilities, transportation assets, and uniform first responder training; and antiquated communication equipment. To counter these deficiencies, the Marine Corps is developing their first responder preparedness program, which is envisioned to be a centrally managed and funded-locally executed program. Installation commanders, via their respective antiterrorism officers, then will be responsible for execution of the program. The Marine Corps will publish doctrine and guidance and provide implementation procedures to appropriate installation personnel. The Marine Corps will also utilize the information gathered by EAI Corporation to correct these deficiencies.

SUMMARY

Until recently, the Services addressed installation first responder preparedness on a Service unique basis primarily at the installation level. However, with the increased possibility of a WMD event occurring on our installations, the Department has initiated a focused, coordinated approach to installation preparedness. As previously discussed in the report, DoD Instructions 2000.16, "DoD Antiterrorism Standards," was written to specifically address antiterrorism issues. The Department has dedicated over $4.7 million in support of installation pilot programs for Fiscal Year 2001 and will continue to review future requirements.

As the Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP) was the foundation to prepare our civilian communities, the Installation Pilot Program is the model for first responder preparedness to our Service installations. The Pilot Program is an excellent baseline, which provides first responder information that can better prepare DoD for a possible WMD event on or near our installations. Additionally, the program enables the Services to capture lessons learned that will benefit all installations, just as lessons have been learned from the Improved Response Program (IRP) portion of the DPP.

The Standardized Equipment List is another major step in the right direction to promote interoperability with local communities, as well as among our Services and their installations. It provides a common platform for both the military and civilian first responders.

The assessments of our installations are another major area of progress. Efforts to consolidate and harmonize the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments ensure issues are addressed, and that there is uniformity of approach. These efforts will act as a conduit for continuing to share "lessons learned" and upgrading initiatives that will benefit all installations.

The OASD SO/LIC is presently staffing interim policy guidance to the Services, which focuses on planning, training, equipment, funding and priorities for installation first responder preparedness. This effort will be completed by late summer 2001 and permanent, long-term guidance will be forthcoming by year end.

ANNEX A
PILOT INSTALLATIONS
BY SERVICE

1. ARMY:

- Fort Bragg, North Carolina
- Fort Dix, New Jersey
- Fort Carson, Colorado
- Fort Monroe, Virginia
- Camp Robinson, Arkansas
- Camp Parks, California
- Fort Bliss, Texas
- Dugway Proving Ground, Utah
- Site R, Fort Dietrick, Maryland
- Holston Army Ammunition Plant, Tennessee
- Anniston Depot, Alabama

2. AIR FORCE:

- McChord AFB, Seattle, Washington
- Osan AB, South Korea
- Peterson AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado
- Pope AFB, Fayetteville, North Carolina
- Prince Sultan AB, Al Kharj, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
- Robins AFB, Warner Robins, Georgia

3. NAVY

- Naval Support Activity, Bahrain
- Navy Region Mid-Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
- Naval Support Activities, Naples & Gaeta, Italy
- Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, Japan
- Navy Region Southwest (Guam)

4. MARINE CORPS:

- Marine Corps Air Station, Miramar, California
- Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia
- Additional Installations Involved:
  - Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina
  - Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California
  - Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California
  - Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia